ios-backup-forensic
Native, read-only, panic-free reading of iOS device backups — encrypted ones included.
- Purpose & Scope — what this is for, and what it deliberately is not.
- Implementation census — how we compare with eleven independent implementations, and the three defects it found in ours.
- Validation — what correctness rests on, tier by tier, and the gap that is still open.
- Decisions — the ADRs.
- Test data — fixture provenance.
The decisions
| ADR | |
|---|---|
| 0001 | Reader and analyzer are two crates |
| 0002 | sqlite-core reads Manifest.db |
| 0003 | Truncate to the recorded size; never strip padding |
| 0004 | A failed unwrap is a wrong password |
| 0005 | A credentials seam for mounting tools |
| 0006 | An absent domain is reported unrated |
| 0007 | The 1.88 MSRV is inherited, not ours |
| 0008 | A fileID is validated, never sanitised |
| 0009 | The effective encryption state, not the declaration |