Deferred scope

APFS-native encryption (macOS 10.13+)

FileVault has two distinct on-disk formats:

1. CoreStorage / FileVault 2 (10.7 Lion – 10.15 Catalina) — implemented here. Reference: libyal libfvde; oracle: pyfvde.
2. APFS-native (software) encryption (10.13 High Sierra onward, the default once the boot volume is APFS) — deferred.

APFS-native encryption is a different format: the key hierarchy and encrypted extents live inside the APFS container (keybag, per-volume VEK/KEK, cryptexts), not in CoreStorage metadata. libfvde does not cover it, there is no settled open-source reference decryptor, no Rust crate, and no ready oracle with a known password. Attempting it from memory would be the exact "decrypt-to-wrong-plaintext-silently" failure the oracle-first discipline exists to prevent.

It is a separate future phase: it belongs with an APFS container reader (apfs-forensic) and needs its own authoritative spec + independent oracle before any crypto is written.

Recovery-password / institutional-key protectors

The PassphraseWrappedKEKStruct unlock path is protector-agnostic — a recovery password (XXXX-XXXX-…, used verbatim including dashes as the PBKDF2 password) would unlock through the same code. It is not validated here because the available oracle volume carries only a user-password protector. Unlocking with a recovery password should work by construction but is untested against an oracle; treat it as unvalidated until a recovery-key oracle is sourced.